Abstract

ABSTRACTABSTRACTWestminster ratified the Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Act in 2022. It provides that: (a) PMs’ ability to dissolve parliament through the monarch is restored. (b) Writs for general elections are bestowed upon the executive. (c) Some applications of the royal prerogative are non-justiciable. This article presents a critical summary of the history and content of the act, and it discusses its implications. (1) The repeal of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act re-introduces flexibility vis-à-vis election timing. (2) The DCPA implies a transfer of dissolution authority from parliament back to governments. (3) The elimination of statutory confidence motions implies a return to the convention-based confidence procedure. This article argues that the bill rekindles cabinet supremacy. (i) Elections can be more easily strategically scheduled to the ruling party’s advantage. (ii) PMs can substantiate the employment of confidence votes with the threat of dissolution again. (iii) Leaders might capitalise on the absence of judicial review to further their agenda or elude the test of confidence. Altogether, the bill reshapes the relationship between the government and the legislature by deepening executive dominance to pre-FTPA levels and perhaps even higher, given the non-justiciability clause, at least as long as elections produce single-party majority cabinets.KEYWORDS: Dissolution and Calling of Parliaments Act 2022Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011agenda-setting powersvotes of confidenceparliamentary dissolutionelection timingjudicial reviewroyal prerogative Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Additional informationNotes on contributorsFrancesco BromoFrancesco Bromo is a PhD Candidate in Political Science at Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, USA. He is a graduate of the University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, UK (2019) where he undertook a joint honours degree in Politics and International Relations and Economics. His PhD thesis focuses on the use and consequences of government-initiated votes of confidence in parliamentary democracies and related features of parliamentarism. His research interests include: legislatures; executives; constitutional design, procedures, and practices; the evolution of democratic institutions; and coalition governance.